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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges have solicited sexual favors from criminal defendants,
civil litigants, lawyers (including prosecutors, public defenders, and
private counsel), law clerks, law students, court employees, job appli-
cants, probation officers, juvenile court wards, and jurors. 1 Some
have specifically demanded sex for favorable treatment and have retal-
iated when their demands were not met.2 Despite the seriousness of
this conduct, however, sanctions imposed against offending judges
have been surprisingly light. In a typical case, a judge found to have
engaged in sexually harassing conduct receives nothing more than a
censure, reprimand, or admonishment. In some of the more blatant
cases, judges are suspended or removed from office. A few judges
have been suspended from the practice of law.3 Even fewer have been
criminally prosecuted.4 In short, the legal response to sexual harass-
ment by judges has been disproportionately low compared to the mag-
nitude of the problem.
This Article explores several issues related to sexual harassment
* Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
I thank my research assistant, Eric Vos, Temple University School of Law, Class of 1992,
without whom this article would not have been completed, and my colleagues at Temple, Sam
Gyandoh, Mary Hanna, Laura Little, Peter Sevareid, and David Weinstein. I thank also
Monroe Freedman, Karen Czapanskiy, Ellen Podgor, Freada Klein, Karen Porter, and Lynn
Hecht Schafran for their helpful suggestions on an early draft.
1. See infra Section III.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 65-80.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33 & 50.
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by judges. In an attempt to provide some insight into the magnitude
of the problem, Section II of the Article examines the reports of vari-
ous state task forces and committees on gender bias and sexual har-
assment in the courts. Section III recounts specific examples of sexual
harassment by judges, and demonstrates how this conduct is met with
woefully inadequate sanctions. Section IV suggests some of the possi-
ble reasons for the continuing tolerance of sexual harassment in the
courts. Section V examines the Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
recently adopted by the ABA, and compares the Code's provisions
with the private sector approach to sexual harassment. Section VI
concludes that rigorous enforcement of the Model Code is necessary
to lessen and eliminate this behavior.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
ITS NATURE AND SCOPE
While reported cases give some sense of the problem, they do not
reflect its magnitude. Very few victims of sexual harassment file for-
mal charges, and complaints in disciplinary cases against judges are
usually confidential. 5 The extent of the problem can best be under-
stood by reviewing the reports of the various state supreme court task
forces on gender bias in the courts.6
For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on
Women in the Courts conducted a survey of the New Jersey Bar in
1984, and reported that twenty-five percent of responding women
5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
6. At their 1988 annual joint meeting, the Conference of Chief Justices and the
Conference of State Court Administrators both adopted resolutions urging every chief justice
to establish a task force on gender bias. L. SCHAFRAN, PROMOTING GENDER FAIRNESS
THROUGH JUDICIAL EDUCATION: A GUIDE TO ISSUES AND RESOURCES 3-4 (1989). As of
May 1, 1990, 13 state supreme court task forces had issued final reports. See, e.g., GENDER
BIAS STUDY COMM'N, FLA. SUPREME COURT, REPORT (1990) [hereinafter FLORIDA TASK
FORCE]; GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, NEV. SUPREME COURT, JUSTICE FOR WOMEN (1988);
MD. SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (1989) [hereinafter
MARYLAND TASK FORCE]; N.Y. TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT (1986),
reprinted in 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11 (1986-1987) [hereinafter NEW YORK TASK FORCE];
R.I. COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (1987); TASK FORCE FOR
GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, MINN. SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT (1989),
reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 827 (1989) [hereinafter MINNESOTA TASK FORCE];
TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS, MICH. SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT
(1989) [hereinafter MICHIGAN TASK FORCE]; TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, N.J.
SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST YEAR REPORT (1984), reprinted in 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
129 (1986) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE]; WASH. STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER
AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (1989) [hereinafter WASHINGTON STATE TASK
FORCE]; see also GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N, SUPREME COURT OF MASS., REPORT
(1989), reprinted in part in 74 MASS. L. REV. 50 (1989) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS TASK
FORCE].
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attorneys had experienced unwelcome sexual advances from judges.7
In 1986, the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts reported
on its survey of attorneys throughout the state which asked whether
judges subjected women attorneys to verbal or physical sexual
advances.' Sixteen percent of the women questioned but only three
percent of the men believed this happened sometimes or often; thirty
one percent of the women and ten percent of the men believed it
rarely happened; and eighty-two percent of the men believed it never
happened.9 Nineteen percent of the female attorneys surveyed by the
Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts
stated that judges subjected women attorneys to verbal and physical
sexual advances.' 0 The Maryland Committee also surveyed court
employees who spent more than half of their time in the courtroom.
Twenty-two percent of the female employees and eight percent of the
male employees said that judges subjected female employees to unwel-
come verbal or physical sexual advances." The 1989 Washington
State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts surveyed
judges. When asked if male judges subjected female judges to verbal
sexual advances, 13.3% of the women judges responded that they
were, but 96.3% of the male judges responded that it never
happened. 12
The 1989 Massachusetts Gender Bias Study Commission
reported that fifteen percent of all attorneys (thirty-one percent of the
women and twelve percent of the men) had witnessed a judge sexually
harass a female attorney by inappropriate sexual comments.' 3 Six
percent of all attorneys (thirteen percent of the women and four per-
cent of the men) had witnessed a judge touch a female attorney in an
inappropriate manner.' 4 Eighteen percent of all attorneys (thirty-
eight percent of the women and fourteen percent of the men) had
observed female litigants, witnesses, and others subjected to inappro-
priate comments of a sexual or suggestive nature.' 5 Six percent of all
attorneys (eleven percent of the women and five percent of the men)
had observed judges touch female litigants, witnesses, and others in
inappropriate ways.16
7. NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 140.
8. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 134.
9. Id. at 134 n.392.
10. MARYLAND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 125.
11. Id. at 82.
12. WASHINGTON TASK FORCE, supra note 6, app. B, at 232.
13. MASSACHUSETrS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 59.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 65.
16. Id.
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In Minnesota, fifteen percent of women attorneys reported that
women litigants or witnesses received verbal sexual harassment from
judges sometimes or often;17 twenty-six percent of women attorneys
identified judges as a source of verbal sexual harassment of women
attorneys sometimes or often;18 and twenty-five percent of women
attorneys reported that judges subjected women attorneys to physical
sexual harassment rarely or sometimes. 9 Forty-seven percent of
women attorneys, but only thirteen percent of men attorneys, said
that in court or in chambers judges sometimes or often make remarks
or jokes demeaning to women.2'
Judges have called women attorneys "honey," "dear," "sweetie,"
"pretty eyes," "baby doll," and "sweetheart." 2 Task forces have
noted the damaging effects of a judge's endearments. The New Jersey
Task Force stated that "what might be considered no more than vio-
lations of etiquette in some social contexts has serious consequences in
the courtroom, where such behavior damages the credibility of female
attorneys, witnesses and litigants. ' 22 The Massachusetts Task Force
concluded that "[t]he overall effect of such behavior is to isolate
female attorneys, cause them (and in some instances, their clients) to
doubt their own abilities and effectiveness, and generally to make
them feel unwelcome."23 Worse, not all such unprofessional conduct
17. MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 926.
18. Id. at 941.
19. Id. at 941-42.
20. Id. at 930.
21. See, e.g., MARYLAND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 123; MASSACHUSETrS TASK
FORCE, supra note 6, at 59; MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 927; NEW JERSEY
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139; WASHINGTON TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 119-20. One
particular judge, Los Angeles Municipal Court Judge David M. Kennick, addressed female
attorneys, criminal defendants, a court clerk, and a police detective as "sweetheart," "honey,"
"dear," "sweetie," and "baby." Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 50 Cal. 3d
297, 324, 787 P.2d 591, 604, 267 Cal. Rptr. 293, 306 (1990). The Supreme Court of California
found this conduct to be "unprofessional, demeaning and sexist." Id. 787 P.2d at 605, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 307. The court censured Kennick for his conduct but removed him from office "on
the sole ground of persistent failure or inability to perform his judicial duties." Id. at 342-43,
787 P.2d at 617, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
22. NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139.
23. MASSACHUSETrS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 59. Similarly, the Florida Gender
Bias Study Commission stated:
There is no question: Judicial behavior of this type is inappropriate in any
setting. But it is especially unethical and prejudicial when occurring in front of
clients and juries. Both the impartiality of the judge and the jurors is subject to
legitimate doubt in the face of such actions and statements. A fair trial in a truly
adversarial setting may become impossible when one of the attorneys is reduced
to a laughing stock by a judge. In this way, justice is defeated. Clients,
confronted by such bias, are given a none too subtle message: Get a male lawyer
or lose your case. This is gender bias of the worst order.
FLORIDA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 199.
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can be considered inadvertent.24
This behavior places women attorneys in an untenable position-
they either endure such conduct from judges with its adverse effects
on clients, witnesses, adversaries, and jurors, or object and face possi-
ble retaliation. The Maryland study quoted one respondent who
"emphasized the no-win position of both the judicial system and the
female attorney when a judge feels free to make sexual advances:
'[The] biggest worry is that your client will be at a disadvantage if you
don't "flirt" back.... ' "2 In New York, women judges "emphasized
the difficulty a female attorney faces when she must decide whether
making an issue of such behavior on the part of a judge or adversary
will prejudice her client's case."'26 Similarly, in New Jersey, "[flemale
attorneys are extremely loath to appear discourteous to a judge who
thinks that he is complimenting them, especially if one feels that tak-
ing such a position will hurt a client or a case."'27 The Florida Gender
Bias Study Commission reported that nearly forty percent of the
women attorneys responding to its survey wanted to file complaints
about unprofessional judicial conduct. 28 All but one refused to do so
for fear of ostracism, or in the belief that no action would be taken.29
The woman who filed the complaint stated that it "was poorly han-
dled and that she had suffered long-term repercussions. "30
III. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM: INADEQUATE SANCTIONS
This Section will review instances of sexual harassment by judges
that have been reported in caselaw. The studies on sexual harassment
24. A male attorney "on several occasions observed the use of a demeaning term of pseudo
endearment to belittle and undermine the professionalism of a female attorney." NEW JERSEY
TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139. Other disturbing incidents and judicial attitudes were
revealed to state task forces. The Minnesota Task Force received a report from a male
attorney that "a judge told me in chambers it was hard to listen to female attorneys when
'really all you can do is think of screwing them.'" MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
929. A female attorney "heard judges and lawyers agree in chambers that certain female
attorneys 'needed a good lay.'" Id. In Massachusetts, an attorney "overheard a comment by
a judge to a courtroom clerk to the effect that he thinks 'women should be kept pregnant and
slapped around once in a while to let them know who's boss.'" MASSACHUSETrS TASK
FORCE, supra note 6, at 60.
25. MARYLAND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 125, see infra note 204 and accompanying
text.
26. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139.
27. NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139.
28. FLORIDA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 206.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Michigan Task Force "noted the concern of a significant number of women
that testifying [before the Task Force] could place a female attorney at risk and that many
women who might wish to speak to issues of discrimination would not come forward for fear
of reprisal." MICHIGAN TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 85.
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in the workplace and the findings of the state supreme court gender
bias task forces show that such conduct is not unusual. However,
only the most blatant cases-usually involving multiple victims and
occurring over an extended period of time-have been found to vio-
late the vague prohibitions of codes of judicial conduct. 31 The penal-
ties imposed are frequently inexplicable, considering the gravity of the
conduct. Judges are often merely censured or suspended, instead of
removed from office. 32 Even if a judge is removed from office, there
may be no discipline or only a short suspension for the judge as a
lawyer.33
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
The Code of Federal Regulations defines quid pro quo sexual
harassment as the explicit or implicit solicitation of sexual favors for
favorable treatment or other benefits.34 Considering the relative posi-
tion of judges vis-a-vis criminal defendants, wards of the court, court
employees, and even relatives of litigants, this type of behavior is espe-
cially objectionable. Nevertheless, reported cases provided numerous
instances of judges engaging in quid pro quo sexual harassment.
For instance, North Carolina Judge Bill J. Martin attempted to
obtain sexual favors from two defendants.35 One defendant was on
her way home during a noon recess when she noticed the judge in a
car behind her, tapping his horn and motioning her to pull over.36
When she told Judge Martin she appreciated his willingness to help
her, "he grinned and said 'Well, how much?' ,37 Martin told another
defendant that he would favorably change her limited driving privi-
leges and made sexual advances toward her. 8 In another incident, a
31. See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). This and other states
codes provide little guidance on matters of sexual harassment. A judge must observe "high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved." Id. at Canon 1. A judge "should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. at Canon 2.
Perhaps the most pertinent provision is Canon 3, which speaks to a judge's adjudicative
responsibilities. Id at Canon 3. This requires a judge to "maintain order and decorum in
proceedings" and "be patient, dignified, and courteous." Id. None of these provisions
suggests any real standard prohibiting sexual harassment in the courtroom. See infra Section
V(B).
32. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 57, 79-80, 90, 111, 119, 128, 138 & 153.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 41, 64, 73, 102, 145 & 149.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1) (1989).
35. In re Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 311, 275 S.E.2d 412, 418 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 304, 275 S.E.2d at 414.
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woman asked why she had accepted a lunch invitation from Judge
Martin responded:
"One, because he was such an important person... and I was just
an individual, a common person..., I felt it was an honor, you
know, him asking me to lunch;... second .... I am kind of scared
of anybody that is in the law. It felt like if I said, no, maybe that
I'd be crossing him in some way, and he'd be mad at me.",
39
The Supreme Court of North Carolina noted that women defendants
were "in particularly vulnerable and susceptible 'bargaining' posi-
tions."'  Nevertheless, the court merely removed Judge Martin from
office.41
The Kentucky Bar Association charged Judge Thomas F. Har-
desty with making "untoward propositions to females who were
before his court as criminal defendants."42 The Supreme Court of
Kentucky found a "strong indication" that Judge Hardesty was offer-
ing the women leniency in exchange for sexual favors.4 3 Judge Har-
desty resigned before the Judicial Retirement and Removal
Commission completed its investigation." The commission neverthe-
less publicly censured him." The Kentucky Bar Association began
proceedings against him as an attorney." Although the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that a one-year suspension from the practice of
law would have been an appropriate penalty for such misconduct, it
dismissed the proceedings on procedural grounds.47
Judge Robert Dean Hawkins resigned after Kentucky's Judicial
Retirement and Removal Commission found that he had engaged in
sexual relations with two female juvenile wards under his jurisdic-
tion.48 The Commission believed public censure was the most severe
sanction that it could impose since he had resigned.4 9 In contrast, the
New York Commission on Judicial Conduct found that Judge
Thomas Mills' conduct warranted formal removal despite his resigna-
tion.50 This town court justice engaged in a relationship with a seven-
39. Id. at 317, 275 S.E.2d at 422.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 320, 275 S.E.2d at 423-24.





47. Id. at 88.
48. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY DIGEST
KY4 (Jan. 1981-June 1986).
49. Id. A criminal court convicted Hawkins of tampering with a grand jury investigation
of his conduct. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at NY61. This is one of the few cases where there was a criminal investigation. Id.
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teen-year-old, knowing that she was scheduled to appear before him
in court, failed to reveal his personal relationship, and offered to dis-
qualify himself only after he learned of a criminal investigation con-
cerning his conduct and after he had already arraigned and released
the defendant without bail. 1 In another New York case, the court
found William M. Higgins, a family court judge, guilty of "soliciting
and agreeing 'to accept sexual favors of' a female, in consideration for
which [he] represented to her that the exercise of his duties as a Judge
of the Family Court of Suffolk County would be influenced in her
favor."' 52 Although Higgins resigned from the bench, the court sus-
pended him from the practice of law for two years.53
The Florida Bar accused Circuit Court Judge Alfonso C. Sepe of
"soliciting sexual favors from the wife of a convict in exchange for a
reduction in the sentence." 4 He denied the accusation, but conceded
that "some of his statements and actions were misconstrued and
thereby considered improper by the convict's wife."'5 5 The Florida
Judicial Qualifications Commission investigated, but published no
results because Judge Sepe resigned.56 Judge Sepe submitted a condi-
tional guilty plea to the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar in
exchange for a public reprimand against him in his capacity as a
lawyer.5 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina removed Judge Charles T.
Kivett from office for wilful misconduct, including obstruction of jus-
tice.58 Kivett granted lenient treatment on various traffic charges to
the son of a woman with whom he had sexual relations.59 Similarly,
he requested that an assistant district attorney reduce a charge of
driving under the influence and took a plea to this charge from
another woman with whom he had been sexually involved.6' Judge
Kivett also touched a probation officer in a manner that she consid-
ered to be a sexual assault.6 Judge Kivett was unethically involved
with a bail bondsman who "lined up" women for the judge to "take
out."62 The bail bondsman testified that Johnson "had engaged in sex
51. Id.
52. In re Higgins, 79 A.D.2d 145, 145, 436 N.Y.S.2d 71, 71 (App. Div. 1981).
53. Id. at 146, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
54. Florida Bar v. Sepe, 380 So. 2d 1040, 1040 (Fla. 1980).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1041.
58. In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 673, 309 S.E.2d 442, 464 (1983).
59. Id. at 648-49, 309 S.E.2d at 450.
60. Id. at 659-60, 309 S.E.2d at 456.
61. Id. at 661-62, 309 S.E.2d at 457-58.
62. Id. at 645, 309 S.E.2d at 453.
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with a lady juror in Chambers [while] a chief deputy or deputy had
guarded the door."6 The Supreme Court of North Carolina removed
Judge Kivett from office."
A particularly notorious case involved Bertram R. Gelfand, the
Surrogate of Bronx County.6" The New York Court of Appeals
found that Judge Gelfand misused his office to "prolong a sexual rela-
tionship with a law assistant and, later, to exact personal vengeance
when she refused to continue their affair."" When the judge's law
clerk refused to continue their affair, he fired her, emptied her office
desk, and left the contents on the doorstep on her residence. 67 Gel-
fand left more than sixty annoying and obscene messages on her
answering machine.68 In a "desperate effort" to reach her, Gelfand
falsely identified himself to a doorman as her attorney. 69 He con-
fronted her boyfriend and threatened to speak to his employer, the
Bronx County District Attorney, and have the boyfriend fired if he
did not reveal her whereabouts. 70 Gelfand called the Deputy Chief
Administrative Judge and asked him to view unfavorably any applica-
tion that the law clerk might submit for a position in the court sys-
tem.7' Gelfand even met with the law clerk's new employer and
"remonstrated with [him] because he had hired the law assistant with-
out first consulting him.I72 The court removed Gelfand from office.73
63. Id. at 647, 309 S.E.2d at 449.
64. Id. at 673, 309 S.E.2d at 464.
65. In re Gelfand, 70 N.Y.2d 211, 512 N.E.2d 533, 518 N.Y.S.2d 950, cert. denied, 484
U.S. 977 (1987).







73. Id. at 217, 512 N.E.2d at 536, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 953. In a subsequent development, the
New York Times reported that the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct had
cautioned Presiding Justice Francis T. Murphy, Jr., of the Appellate Division for the First
Department, the appellate court for Manhattan and the Bronx, "against interfering--or even
the appearance of interfering-with disciplinary proceedings against lawyers within his
jurisdiction." N.Y. Times, July 6, 1990, at BI, col. 4. Justice Murphy was charged with using
his influence to open an investigation against the same ex-law clerk of former Bronx Surrogate
Gelfand. The article reported that Bronx Politicians regarded Judge Gelfand as a friend of
Justice Murphy. Id. at B2, col. 3. A few days later, the Times reported thah Justice Murphy
had claimed that the State Commission on Judicial Conduct had cleared him of all charges,
and Justice Murphy released a confidential letter from the Commission which said the
Commission had " 'decided to conclude this matter with issuance of this letter of dismissal and
caution.'" N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at BI, col. 3. The Times noted that "the Commission
has the power to issue such a letter after finding that an allegation was not serious enough to
warrant public discipline." Id.
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The case against Judge Harold L. Hammond involved both quid
pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation.74 The Kansas Commis-
sion on Judicial Qualifications found that Judge Hammond required
two employees to engage in sexual relations with him as a condition of
employment."' Judge Hammond terminated one of the employees
when the employee refused to continue their physical relationship; the
other was terminated for refusing to have such a relationship.76 Judge
Hammond retired because of a physical disability77 after the commis-
sion recommended censure and suspension without pay for six
months.7' The Supreme Court of Kansas published the censure and
ordered costs. Although the court found "[tihe exacting or the
demanding of sexual favors as a condition of employment ... repre-
hensible, ' 79 it concluded that "[s]uch conduct merits discipline no less
substantial than that recommended by the Commission, and perhaps
removal from office."' 0
Judge Alberto 0. Miera made unwelcome sexual advances to his
male court reporter.81 At oral argument before the Minnesota
Supreme Court, Miera contended, "[T]here's no harm in asking."82
The court, however, disagreed: "[H]e was a court reporter, a close
personal assistant who serves at the judge's discretion. Both the judi-
cial office and the unique relationship between judge and reporter
make this employee particularly vulnerable to abuse of power. It is
disingenuous to assert that Johnson could simply say 'no.' P983
In two other incidents, Judge Miera engaged in conduct that
could be considered "hostile environment sexual harassment," dis-
cusses in the next subsection. Miera once asked four female employ-
ees in the court clerk's office, "Do you people eat bananas for the
vitamins or for the phallic symbol they represent?" 84 On another
occasion, Judge Miera touched the shirt of a female court employee.83
Instead of recognizing the two incidents as hostile environment sexual
harassment, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the inci-
dents were not "wilfully offensive" and did not "represent[] a sexual
74. In re Hammond, 224 Kan. 745, 585 P.2d 1066 (1978).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 746, 585 P.2d at 1067.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 851 (Minn. 1988).
82. Id. at 855.
83. Id. at 855-56.
84. Id. at 856.
85. Id.
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advance of some kind."86 The court characterized them as "slightly
risque humor"87 and concluded that "[b]y themselves, the incidents
would not warrant discipline."88 The Board on Judicial Standards
recommended Judge Miera's removal,89 but the supreme court
ordered only public censure and a one-year suspension without pay
and publicly reprimanded him in his capacity as a lawyer.9
B. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Conduct constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment if it
unreasonably interferes with performance or creates an intimidating
or offensive environment.91 The reported- hostile environment cases
often involve a large number of women who were the objects of the
judges' sexual harassment. Two of the most egregious examples of
hostile environment sexual harassment involved judges in the State of
Washington.
Judge Mark S. Deming92 harassed so many women that the
Washington Supreme Court found it necessary to categorize the com-
plainants as district court personnel, probation personnel, prosecuting
attorney personnel, and assigned counsel personnel.93 Moreover, the
court gave only "illustrative excerpts" of the judge's misconduct. 94
Judge Deming once asked a third-year law student in his chambers to
"take [her] clothes off and bend over." '  He told a docket clerk to
stand up and then hugged her and unlatched her bra strap: "He then
said something to the effect of, 'Gee, I haven't lost my touch,' and was
kind of tickled with himself."96 On another occasion, Judge Deming
told a deputy prosecuting attorney that he had reached "a heightened
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 858.
90. Id. at 859.
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1989).
92. In re Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82, 736 P.2d 639 (1987).
93. Id. at 111, 736 P. 2d at 654.
94. Id.
95. Id. The use of such terms toward women is not unusual. The Massachusetts Task
Force reported that when an attorney "stated that she believed that her client 'had bent
enough' in attempting to reach a compromise, the judge replied that from what he could see,
her client [had] been bending for years.' This comment caused an uproar in the courtroom."
MASSACHUSETrS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 66. In New York, Brooklyn District Attorney
Elizabeth Holtzman reported that on a hot summer day a male defense counsel was given
permission to remove his jacket. The female assistant district attorney "asked the male judge
in open court if she too could remove her jacket. The judge replied: 'Don't remove your
jacket unless you intend to remove all of your clothes' " NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note
6, at 132-33.
96. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 112, 736 P.2d at 655.
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state of excitement" seeing her on the witness stand.97 He told
another deputy prosecuting attorney it the end of the docket, "I
would really like to jump your bones." ' He winked at an attorney
from the Department of Assigned Counsel and then blew her a kiss in
his courtroom. Her client asked "What's going on?" as observers in
the gallery glared at the attorney and some even giggled.9 9 In yet
another incident, a law student intern appeared in his courtroom and
asked a male prosecutor if she could interrupt. The prosecutor agreed
and said to Judge Deming, "Well, Your Honor, Miss [Name] is here
on a matter that will be very quick." The judge responded, "Oh, she's
here for a quickie, uh.'' ° Judge Deming liked touching a particular
probation officer and, when she refused once, Deming "chased [her]
around his clerk's desk. He ended up jumping over the top ... to
touch [her]." 10' Deming was removed from office by the Supreme
Court of Washington. 0 2 In its opinion the supreme court noted:
The victims of Judge Deming's inappropriate actions were women
who had to appear in his courtroom or who were under his super-
vision and control. His actions were unprofessional, demeaning
and embarrassing to the involuntary participants, who suffered
varying degrees of anger, anguish, intimidation and humiliation.
Judge Deming's sexual harassment and intimidation of women
subject to his authority is inexcusable, and violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
10 3
However, the court inexplicably added that "we feel a sense of sad-
ness and appreciate the tragic consequences of his lack of social
graces, restraint and decorum.""' Such characterizations minimize
the severity of the hostile environment created for women attorneys,
law students, and court and probation personnel.
The other Washington judge is Marvin C. Buchanan. 05 Judge
Buchanan "freely commented about the size of one staff member's
breasts and speculated about the type of lingerie the employees
97. Id.
98. Id. at 114-15, 736 P.2d at 656.
99. Id. at 115, 736 P.2d at 656. Similar conduct was found in Massachusetts, whose Task
Force reported, "Other complaints were registered against a judge who, after considering an
argument for a temporary restraining order, smiled at the female attorney, signed the order,
[and] said, 'anything for you, honey,' and blew her a kiss." MASSACHUSETTS TASK FORCE,
supra note 6, at 59.
100. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d at 116, 736 P.2d at 657.
101. Id. at 114, 736 P.2d at 656.
102. Id. at 121, 736 P.2d at 659.
103. Id. at 117, 736 P.2d at 657.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. In re Buchanan, 100 Wash. 2d 396, 669 P.2d 1248 (1983).
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wore.''°6 He requested another employee to wear clothing "which,
according to the judge, 'looked sexy on her.' 1107 The judge asked
women job applicants personal and immaterial questions about their
spouses, and whether the applicants were willing to go on boating or
flying trips with him. 08 Judge Buchanan's employees tolerated his
conduct for fear of reprisal." 9 Indeed, once the complaint was filed,
the judge discharged two female staffers, although he had previously
expressed satisfaction with their performance.1 0 Since Buchanan did
not file for reelection and was no longer a judge, censure was the
strongest sanction available to the Supreme Court of Washington."'
Circuit Court Judge Christ Seraphim of Milwaukee County also
engaged in hostile environment sexual harassment." 2 The objects of
Judge Seraphim's attention were an employee of the Wisconsin Cor-
rection Services, a journalism student who attended his court, a guest
at a wedding he performed, and a legal secretary in the public
defender's office." 3 When the wedding guest went to shake his hand,
he grabbed her, "put his arm around her and, as his hand reached the
side of her breast, he said, 'Hey, baby, is all that you?' " " He met
the legal secretary on a bus and asked her to marry him." 5 When
they reached the Milwaukee Safety Building and entered an elevator,
he "started kissing her on the face and nibbling on her ear. When she
opened her mouth to protest, [Seraphim] put his tongue in her
mouth."' 6  The Judicial Commission recommended Seraphim's
removal or, in the alternative, suspension without pay for at least
three years.1 7 The panel found the incidents involved "unprivileged
and nonconsensual physical contacts with offensive sexual over-
tones." I 8 In other words, they were tantamount to sexual assaults.
However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin opted for a lesser penalty
of three years suspension, stating, "Standing alone any one of the vio-





111. Id. at 400-01, 669 P.2d at 1251.
112. In re Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
113. Id. at 501-03, 294 N.W.2d at 494-95.
114. Id. at 502, 294 N.W.2d at 495. The Minnesota Task Force reported an incident where
"[a]t a bar dinner, a judge began stroking the arm of a woman attorney whom he had just been
introduced to, then started pulling her toward him, with his arm around her shoulder."
MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 943.
115. Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d at 503, 294 N.W.2d at 495.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 513, 294 N.W.2d at 500.
118. Id. at 503, 294 N.W.2d at 495.
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lations, or even perhaps several, would not warrant suspension or
removal. Censure or reprimand would be appropriate."' 19 Although
in each instance Seraphim took advantage of his judicial position for
sexual gratification, the court concluded that "[h]e was not charged
with any serious violation of the criminal law nor any corrupt con-
duct in office."'
120
Justice of the Peace Fred S. Ackel flirted with one litigant, stat-
ing that he was taught "how to put a rubber on." 1 2 1 He later queried,
"I'm oral. Are you?' 22 He stared at her chest, hugged her, and
called her "honey" and "cute."' 23 He placed his arms on the shoul-
ders of two female attorneys and called them "honey," "babe,"
"dear," and "sweetie."' 24 He used similar terms of endearment on a
deputy county attorney and his law clerks in his office.' 25 He also
hugged his clerks. 26  Although the Judicial Commission recom-
mended removal, 12 the Supreme Court of Arizona reduced Ackel's
punishment to censure because "the record [did] not indicate that
Ackel ever conditioned his performance on the return of favors, sex-
ual or otherwise."' 2  Even if this were true, the court undercut the
seriousness of hostile environment sexual harassment for women
attorneys, clerks, and litigants. In dissent, Vice Chief Justice Feld-
119. Id. at 513, 294 N.W.2d at 500.
120. Id.
121. In re Ackel, 155 Ariz. 34, 36, 745 P.2d 92, 94 (1987).
122. Id. In Minnesota, "[a] judge told attorneys in chambers that while he was 'bald on
top' he has 'plenty of thick pubic hair, ha ha ha." MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
942.
123. Ackel, 155 Ariz. at 36, 745 P.2d at 94.
124. Id. at 42, 745 P.2d at 100. The Minnesota Task Force reported a similar incident
where the "[]udge put his arm around [a] woman attorney, hugged her, [and] made flirtatious
remarks when she requested information on how to proceed in completing forms for court."
MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 943, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
125. Ackel, 155 Ariz. at 42, 745 P.2d at 100. The Minnesota Task Force included a section
on abuse of law clerks: "Reports that women attorneys had experienced physical sexual
harassment came... from women who had served as law clerks to judges.... Reports of
physical harassment of women law clerks by judges came from at least four different judicial
districts." MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 942. A female attorney reported to the
task force that "a judge continually pawed, touched, and made inappropriate sexual
comments to his female law clerk.... I observed these things and heard daily accounts." Id.
Another said, "One judge unzipped his pants and adjusted his shirt in chambers repeatedly in
front of his female clerk. She never felt safe enough to report it. She told me about it .... This
had a lasting impact on her self-esteem." Id. Another reported, "I worked for a judge who
kissed me on the mouth and patted my rear very suddenly one day.... I recently became
aware of two secretaries who [sic] he has similarly harassed." Id.
126. Ackel, 155 Ariz. at 42, 745 P.2d at 100.
127. Id. at 43, 745 P.2d at 101.
128. Id.
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man viewed the facts differently and would have removed Ackel from
the bench:
The respondent obviously sought sexual favors from [the litigant]
and made it quite clear that although nothing was demanded of
her, compliance would bring judge and litigant to an even better
working relationship. Together, the judge and [she] would work to
"get the son of a bitch." The problem, of course, is that the "son of
a bitch" in question was the other party to the litigation before the
judge. 129
The dissenter found the conduct amounted to the solicitation of sex-
ual favors for justice 3 -- the definition of quid pro quo sexual
harassment.
Detroit Recorder's Court Judge James Del Rio also sexually
harassed a series of women.13 1 In the middle of a hearing in open
court, Judge Del Rio called a female criminal defense attorney for a
bench conference and asked her for a date. 132 She declined the offer
and later, whenever she appeared before him, Judge Del Rio treated
her with disdain. 133 Judge Del Rio asked a newspaper reporter who
had refused a date with him whether she was a lesbian. 34 When the
reporter later came into his court, he verbally embarrassed and
abused her.' 3- Judge Del Rio was once overheard speaking to a
female juror assigned to a case in progress before him, asking whether
it would be all right to call her when the case was over. 136 The Judi-
cial Tenure Commission recommended Judge Del Rio's removal.1
37
The Supreme Court of Michigan disregarded the recommendation
and instead imposed a five-year suspension without pay.' 38
Los Angeles Municipal Court Judge Leland W. Geiler harassed
his law clerk, two female attorneys, and the calendar coordinator.
39
In one instance, he was in his chambers with five or six men when he
called in his female law clerk. After she had left, the judge asked the
129. Id. (Feldman, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977).
132. Id. at 720, 256 N.W.2d at 750. Similar conduct has been reported elsewhere. "A male
judge interrupted a female prosecutor's opening statement and called her to the bench to tell
her he liked the way she was wearing her hair that day." MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra
note 6, at 928.
133. Del Rio, 400 Mich. at 720, 256 N.W.2d at 750.
134. Id. at 722 n.27, 256 N.W.2d at 751 n.27.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 720 n.25, 256 N.W.2d at 750 n.25.
137. Id. at 671-72, 256 N.W.2d at 728-29.
138. Id. at 726, 256 N.W.2d at 753.
139. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 277, 515 P.2d 1, 5,
110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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other men, "How would you like to eat that?"'" He occasionally
asked the clerk, "Did you get any last night?"'' and he often told the
her she was "nothing but a fucking clerk."1 42 In addition to his har-
assment of women, Judge Geiler, in a public corridor of the Hall of
Justice, grabbed a court commissioner's testicles from behind. 143 He
prodded a male deputy public defender with a dildo during a confer-
ence in chambers and referred to the incident twice in open court in
order to curtail the defender's cross-examination of two witnesses.'"
The California Supreme Court removed Geiler from office but
allowed him to continue to practice law.
145
The California Supreme Court also found Municipal Court
Judge Richard Ryan guilty of four acts of wilful misconduct and four-
teen acts of prejudicial conduct.'" Among other things, Judge Ryan
liked to tell jokes.147 At a preliminary hearing in his chambers, Judge
Ryan asked the two female attorneys who were present if they knew
the difference "between a Caesar salad and a blow job."'' 4  When the
140. Id. at 277 n.6, 515 P.2d at 5 n.6, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 205 n.6. Similar conduct was
reported in Massachusetts:
An attractive female prosecutor was called away from her work in the law library
by a court officer who told her that Judge X wanted to see her. When she arrived
at the judge's chambers, where Judge X was conversing with a male attorney and
a male court officer, the judge said to the others: "see what I mean guys-O.K.
you can go now."
MASSACHUSETrS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 60.
141. Geiler, 10 Cal. 3d at 277 n.6, 515 P.2d at 5 n.6, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 205 n.6.
142. Id. The California Commission on Judicial Performance charged Municipal Court
Judge Mario P. Gonzales with 21 instances of wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct.
Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 33 Cal. 3d 359, 364, 657 P.2d 372, 373, 188
Cal. Rptr. 880, 881 (1983). The Commission charged Gonzales with improperly engaging in
personal verbal attacks and improper sexual and ethnic remarks both in open court and in
private communications with persons associated with the court. Id. at 889-90, 657 P.2d at
381, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 376. However, the California Supreme Court was not persuaded that
the charge of consistently making improper and unwarranted sexual advances towards a
municipal court interpreter was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 377, 657
P.2d at 382, 188 Cal. Rptr at 890. The court removed Judge Gonzales from office but allowed
him to practice law on condition that he pass a professional responsibility examination. Id. at
378, 657 P.2d at 383, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
143. Geiler, 10 Cal. 3d at 278, 515 P.2d at 5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 205. Judge Geiler's grip
caused the commissioner "so much pain that he almost passed out. Nevertheless, [the
commissioner] considered the conduct to be friendly horseplay." Id. at 277 n.6, 515 P.2d at 5
n.6, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 205 n.6.
144. Id. at 277, 515 P.2d at 5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 205. The Minnesota Task Force also noted
the "frequent use of the term 'dildo' during settlement negotiations." MINNESOTA TASK
FORCE, supra note 6, at 942.
145. Geiler, 10 Cal. 3d at 287, 515 P.2d at 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
146. Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 45 Cal. 3d 518, 546, 754 P.2d 724, 741,
247 Cal. Rptr. 378, 395 (1988).
147. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
148. Ryan, 45 Cal. 3d at 544, 754 P.2d at 739, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
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female attorneys responded that they did not, the judge said, "Great,
let's have lunch."' 14 9 The Supreme Court of California removed Ryan
from the bench, but allowed him to continue practicing law upon pas-
sage of a professional responsibility examination.'
New York Judge John J. Fromer, publicly commenting to a
newspaper reporter regarding a possible sentence reduction in a pend-
ing rape case, stated, "Maybe they ended up enjoying themselves."'
151
The New York Commission on Judicial Conduct noted that the state-
ments were humiliating to the victim and could possibly discourage
complainants from filing rape charges. 52 Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion merely censured Judge Fromer.'5 a Similarly, although Judge
Warren M. Doolittle made numerous improper comments to female
attorneys over a four-year period and suggested that they could get
whatever they were asking of the court because of their physical
appearance, the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct merely
admonished him.'54
IV. EXPLAINING THE PROBLEM: THE DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS
OF MEN AND WOMEN
Sexual harassment has traditionally been, and continues to be,
primarily a women's problem. It involves abuse of power,'55 and
because women have not historically held power positions, the per-
ceptions of men and women regarding sexual harassment vary
considerably. 156
For example, in a study by the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts, 57 sixteen percent of women but only three percent of
men believed that judges subjected women attorneys to verbal or
physical sexual advances sometimes or often. 158 Conversely, eighty-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 518, 547, 754 P.2d 724, 741, 247 Cal. Rptr. 378, 395 (1988).
151. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 48, at NY63. In Massachusetts, a
prosecutor reported that at least four "superior court judges before whom she has appeared
have made demeaning comments about rape victims." MASSACHUSETIrS TASK FORCE, supra
note 6, at 59.
152. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 48, at NY63.
153. Id. (The decision does not state whether Fromer received any punishment other than
censure.).
154. In re Doolittle (N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, June 13, 1985) (Westlaw, JDDD
database).
155. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and Social
Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L. REV. 91, 98 (1987).
156. Collins & Blogett, Sexual Harassment... Some See It... Some Won't, 59 HARV. Bus.
REV. 76, 78 (1981).
157. NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 6.
158. Id. at 134 n.392.
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two percent of the men, but only forty-seven percent of the women,
believed it never happened. 15 9 When asked whether judges subjected
women litigants or witnesses to verbal or physical sexual advances,
nine percent of the women attorneys in the New York survey, but
only two percent of the men, answered that it happened sometimes or
often.16° In contrast, eighty-three percent of the men, but only forty-
nine percent of the women, reported that it never happened. 161 Simi-
larly, although the Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender
Bias in the Courts reported that nineteen percent of female attorneys
stated that judges subjected women attorneys to verbal and physical
sexual advances, 62 judges and male attorneys surveyed generally
believed that such conduct rarely or never occurred.1
63
A comparable problem occurs with the characterization of sexual
harassment. For example, courts often experience difficulty in distin-
guishing between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment. The difficulty may result from the different perception of the
sexes: what women perceive as unwelcome sexual advances implicitly
tied to benefits, courts and commissions composed largely of men may
see as only hostile environment sexual harassment, or not as sexual
harassment at all, but rather "bad manners."164
The problem of differing perceptions is exacerbated by the fact
that the law continues to be a male-dominated profession. Research
confirms that the incidence of sexual harassment drops as the number
of women in the work force increases.' 6 In private industry, the for-
mal complaint rates are highest in companies whose work forces are
at least seventy-five percent male and lowest where work forces are at
least seventy-five percent female. 66 These statistics are of particular
relevance for lawyers, since women constitute only 7.4% of federal
judges, 67 7.2% of state judges,1 68 and 20% of attorneys.
69
Further compounding the problem is that, until recently, codes
of conduct governing judicial behavior have been vaguely worded and
159. Id.
160. Id. at 120 n.347.
161. Id.
162. MARYLAND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 125.
163. Id.
164. See NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 139.
165. KLEIN ASSOCIATES, THE 1988 WORKING WOMAN SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 2
(1988). Working Woman Magazine commissioned the report and published the results.
Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69.
166. KLIEN ASSOCIATES, supra note 165, at 2.
167. ABA Comm. on Women in the Profession, Report to the House of Delegates 6 (1988).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 5.
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arbitrarily applied--especially with regard to sexual harassment. 7 0
Where a particular provision is open to different interpretations, it is
reasonable to assume that the particular interpretation chosen will
reflect prevailing attitudes and perceptions. Thus, in a male domi-
nated profession like the law, one would expect these standards of
conduct to be interpreted from the male point of view. Law, there-
fore, is a profession where a great degree of sexual harassment can be
expected. 1
7'
V. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM
A. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Problems and Solutions
Although this Article focuses specifically on sexual harassment
in the judicial system, the problem itself pervades private industry as
well. Unfortunately, it is difficult to discover the extent of the prob-
lem. Few employees file formal complaint, usually only one percent
to five percent.'7 2 The 1988 Working Woman Sexual Harassment
Survey by Klein Associates (the "Klein Report"), a Massachusetts
consulting firm, reported on Fortune 500 service and manufacturing
companies. 173 Their results indicated that at least fifteen percent of
female employees and five percent of male employees annually exper-
ienced some form of sexual harassment. 17 4 A recent federal govern-
ment study revealed an even higher annual rate: twenty-one percent
for women and seven percent for men.
75
The Klein Report found that "[s]exual harassment costs a typical
Fortune 500 service or manufacturing company $6.7 million per
year-a cost of $282.53 per employee."'' 76 These costs are comprised
170. See supra note 131.
171. Two male authors, both professors at New York University School of Law, stated in
an early, major article on sex discrimination by judges:
Our conclusion, independently reached, but completely shared, is that by and
large the performance of American judges in the area of sex discrimination can
be succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable With some notable
exceptions, they have failed to bring to sex discrimination cases those judicial
virtues of detachment, reflection and critical analysis which have served them so
well with respect to other sensitive social issues.
Johnston & Krapps, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675, 676 (1971). Others have also written about the problems faced bywomen who must
deal with judges. See Gilsinan, Obernyer & Gilsinan, Women Attorneys and the Judiciary, 52
DEN. L.J. 881 (1975); Comment, Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2193
(1988).
172. KLEIN ASSOCIATES, supra note 165, at 26.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. at 10.
175. See id. at 10.
176. Id. at 2.
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of "turnover, absenteeism, reduced productivity, and [the use of]
internal complaint mechanisms." 177 Even this substantial figure may
understate the full financial impact of sexual harassment in the work-
place. For example, the Klein Report did not evaluate the expenses of
"litigation, responding to charges filed with municipal/state/federal
regulatory agencies, destructive behavior and sabotage."17 1 Similarly,
the emotional and psychological stress effects of sexual harassment,
while not easily quantifiable, have also been recognized as
substantial. 179
Although sexual harassment in employment has long been a
problem for women, it was neither spoken of nor recognized as a legal
wrong until recently. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. °80 It was not until 1980, however, that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued regulations
on sexual harassment, a subcategory of sex discrimination.' The
regulations prohibit both quid pro quo, or blackmail harassment, and
hostile environment sexual harassment.8 2 The regulations require
employers to specifically express strong disapproval of sexual harass-




179. See Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job: Implications for Counseling,
52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539 (1982); Wells & Angel, Sexual Harassment: A Psychiatric
and Legal Analysis, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Dec. 1990, at 49.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
181. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)-(e) (1980) (now codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)-(g) (1989)).
182. See supra Section III. Quid pro quo harassment is defined by in the Code of Federal
Regulations as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... either explicitly or implicitly" linked to the grant of or
denial of economic benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(l), (2) (1989). Hostile environment sexual
harassment is recognized as an action which "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." Id. § 1604.1 1(a)(3).
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1989). Sexual harassment has been recognized as a serious
problem in such diverse, non-employment settings as education, see, e.g., Biernat, Subjective
Criteria in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title VII: A Camouflage for Discrimination
and Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 501 (1987); Crocker & Simon, Sexual
Harassment in Education, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 541 (1981); Freedman, The Professional
Responsibility of the Law Professor: Three Neglected Questions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 275 (1986);
Inguilli, Sexual Harassment in Education, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 281 (1987); Schneider, Sexual
Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1987); housing, see, e.g., Comment,
Home Is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1061
(1987); Comment, Sexual Harassment in Rental Housing, U. ILL. L. REV. 175 (1989); and
prisons, see, e.g., Comment, Women Prisoners: Freedom from Sexual Harassment, A
Constitutional Analysis, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 667 (1983).
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Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson 184 is the leading case on sex-
ual harassment. Writing for the United States Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "[w]ithout question when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."' 5 Under the EEOC
regulations, 8 6 the proper inquiry is whether the sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether participation was voluntary.' 87 The bank's
"general nondiscrimination policy did not address sexual harassment
in particular, and thus did not alert employees to their employer's
interest in correcting that form of discrimination."'' 18 In addition, the
bank's policy requiring employees to address complaints to their
immediate supervisors placed the employees in an untenable position;
the harassed employee was forced to complain to the harasser.18 9
As a result of Meritor, companies must now have a specific policy
prohibiting sexual harassment, a policy which is adequately publi-
cized to both rank-and-file and supervisory employees."9 Further,
there must be a reporting mechanism for speedy investigations and
responses to claims of sexual harassment.' 9' Perhaps because the
Meritor Court set out clear standards, perhaps because the financial
costs of non-compliance are enormous, or perhaps because of a grow-
ing awareness in private industry of the scope of the problem, Ameri-
can industry has taken seriously the EEOC regulations and the
Supreme Court's opinion in Meritor. According to the Klein Report,
seventy-six percent of the responding companies had written policies
specifically prohibiting sexual harassment. 92 A legal system which
mandates such policies for employers should require no less of itself.
B. The ABA Solution: The Model Code of Judicial Conduct
The cases do not involve just a few "nuts," but illustrate a serious
problem of judicial misconduct which codes of judicial conduct, with
their general prohibitive language, do not adequately address. In
response to complaints about unduly vague standards of judicial con-
duct, the ABA House of Delegates passed a new Model Code of Judi-
184. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
185. Id. at 64.
186. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
187. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
188. Id. at 72-73.
189. Id. at 73.
190. See U.S. MERIT PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 46-47 (1988).
191. See id. at 47-48.
192. KLIEN ASSOCIATES, supra note 165, at 8.
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cial Conduct at its annual meeting in August 1990.193 The
commentary to Canon 3B(5) now specifically prohibits sexual harass-
ment.1 94 Now, under the Code, a judge "must refrain from speech,
gestures or other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual
harassment and must require the same standard of conduct of others
subject to the judge's direction and control."1 9 Thus, judges are now
subject to the same sort of regulations regarding sexual harassment as
are private employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.196 Of
particular importance to the new Model Code of Judicial Conduct's
specific prohibition of sexual harassment is the Meritor Court's proc-
lamation that "the mere existence of a grievance procedure and a pol-
icy against discrimination, coupled with [a female employee's] failure
to invoke that procedure" cannot insulate the employer from
liability.' 97
Specific condemnation and prohibition of unacceptable judicial
behavior will work to lessen, if not eliminate, gender bias in the
future. 19 It should be noted, however, that judges are not the only
193. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (1990) [hereinafter ABA COMMITTEE REPORT].
194. Id. app. B at 13. This commentary was added as a Committee Amendment to Canon
3B(4). Id. Canon 3B(4) requires that a "judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to
litigants, jurors, witness, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity,
and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials and others subject to
the judge's direction and control." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (1990).
The prohibition against sexual harassment was initially proposed to the Committee after
circulation of its Midyear 1990 Draft by Professor Vanessa Merton, Associate Dean for
Clinical Education at the Pace University Law School. ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 193, app. D. at 9. It was originally proposed as an addition to Canon 3B(5) which
provides:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or
prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction and control to do so.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3B(5).
Since Canon 3B(5) is the general anti-discrimination section, and since sexual harassment
is a sub-category of sex discrimination, the prohibition properly belongs in Cannon 3B(5). It is
not clear why the Committee downgraded it to commentary and moved it to Canon 3B(4).
On a motion from the floor of the ABA House of Delegates, the commentary was moved
from Canon 3B(4) to Canon 3B(5). Telephone interview with William F. Womble, Chair,
ABA Judicial Code Subcommittee, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility (August 9, 1990).
195. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3B(4).
196. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5) with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1 l(a) (1989) (both prohibiting conduct which could be perceived as sexual harassment).
197. Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
198. N. WIKLER & L. SCHAFRAN, LEARNING FROM THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 24-29 (1989).
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source of sexual harassment in the courtroom; lawyers are even
worse.'99 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct addresses this prob-
lem to some extent by obligating judges to hold attorneys and subor-
dinates to the same standard of conduct.2 °° If sexual harassment in
the courts is to be completely eliminated, however, it is necessary to
supplement the Code with an amendment to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for Lawyers specifically prohibiting sexual har-
assment by attorneys. Nevertheless, the standards set out in Mentor,
coupled with the well developed body of law on sexual harassment
under Title VII and the ABA's adoption of a specific prohibition
against sexual harassment by judges, provide the foundation for anal-
ysis of future cases of judicial misconduct.20
199. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 140 (55% of responding female
attorneys had experienced unwelcome sexual advances from male attorneys, with 31% of
female responents and 16% of the male respondents reporting that they had observed sexual
advances towards female witnesses and litigants by attorneys) (compare with statistics for
judges, supra note 7 and accompanying text); NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 134
(36% of the female attorneys and 7% of the male attorneys believed that attorneys often or
sometimes subjected female attorneys to verbal or physical sexual advances, and 29% of the
female attorneys and 72% of the male attorneys believed that it never happened) (compare
with statistics for judges, supra note 9 and accompanying text); MARYLAND TASK FORCE,
supra note 6, at 125 (when asked whether male attorneys subjected women attorneys to verbal
or physical sexual advances 47% of the female attorneys answered affirmatively, as did 7% of
judges, and 8% of male attorneys; 33% of female attorneys and 73% of male attorneys
believed it never happened) (compare with statistics for judges. supra note 11 and
accompanying text); MASSACHUSETTS TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 54-55 (68% of women
attorneys and 32% of male attorneys had observed counsel sexually harass a female attorney
by making inappropriate sexual comments; 42% of female attorneys and 11% of male
attorneys had witnessed counsel touch female attorneys in an inappropriate manner) (compare
with statistics for judges, supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text); MINNESOTA TASK
FORCE, supra note 6, at 926 (33% of female attorneys thought that female litigants or
witnesses received verbal harasssment sometimes or often) (compare with statistics for judges,
supra note 17 and accompanying text); id. at 941 (45% of female attorneys reported that they
are always, sometimes, or often subjected to or have observed verbal sexual harassment from
other male attorneys) (compare with statistics for judges, supra note 18 and accompanying
text); id at 930 (63% of female attorneys and 19% of male attorneys reported comments,
remarks, or jokes demeaning to women are made often or sometimes by attorneys) (compare
with statistics for judges, supra note 20 and accompanying text).
200. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 3B(5).
201. See, e.g., Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment:
Going Beyond Title VII, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1988); Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177 (1990); Holtzman & Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment:
Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 239
(1987); Martucci & Terry, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Legal Overview, LAB. LAW.
125 (1987); Oneglia & Cornelias, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's New Guidelines, 26 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 39 (1981); Vhay,
The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 328 (1988); Vinciquerra, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the
Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717 (1989); Note, Employer Liability Under Title
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VI. CONCLUSION
Our judicial system is one American institution that must be free
of sexual harassment.20 2 State task force surveys have uncovered a
small percentage of judges and lawyers who have forestalled or cor-
rected discriminatory behavior sua sponte.203 Maryland courts, for
example, require that recusal motions alleging judical misconduct be
heard by another judge. 2" Until women make up a greater propor-
tion of the legal profession, however, sexual harassment is likely to be
maglignant problem. The new commentary to the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting sexual harassment has finally subjected
VII for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258
(1987).
202. Claims of sexual harassment are not limited to those against state trial court judges. A
former secretary to United States District Judge Spencer Mortimer Williams filed suit against
the judge individually and in his official capacity as a judge and as founder and past President
of the Federal Judges Associations. Garcia v. Williams, 704 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
The district court did not reach the merits, finding almost all the claims based on sexual
harassment to be time barred. Id. at 1000.
The Florida Task Force received testimony that, "During an oral argument at the Florida
Supreme Court, a judge used a hypothetical about a pretty assistant attorney general wearing a
red blouse' which was exactly what I was wearing." FLORIDA TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at
205.
Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court voluntarily resigned his
position as Chief Justice. In re Neely, 364 S.E.2d 250, 255 (W.Va. 1987). Although the
allegations against Justice Neely did not involve sexual harassment, the judge's conduct was
degrading to women. Justice Neely was admonished by the Supreme Court for requiring his
secretary, as a condition of her employment, to babysit his son "on at least eleven occasions in
a twenty-seven month period, once for more than seven days." Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
The majority stated that his conduct did not "in some way evidence a bias against women."
Id. at 254. Two judges would have publicly censured Justice Neely. The concurring and
dissenting opinion found that "requiring personal services of his secretary in the form of
babysitting ... clearly violate[d]" the Judicial Code of Ethics. Id. at 257.
203. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 141; NEW YORK TASK FORCE,
supra note 6, at 137.
204. Surrat v. Prince Geroge's County, 320 Md. 439, 589 A.2d 745 (1990). In this
groundbreaking decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ordered that another judge decide
the recusal motion of a judge charged with sexual harassment of the plaintiff's attorney. After
the trial judge awarded over $500,000 in an obstetrical malpractice action, the judge ordered a
remittitur reducing the amount by half. Id. at 457, 589 A.2d at 754. Plaintiff's attorney
charged the judge with sexually harassing conduct over a period of ten years. Id. at 462, 589
A.2d at 756. Six days before the trial at issue, during a settlement conference in chambers on
another malpractice case, the attorney claimed the judge "asked whether she had a 'steady'
yet. She asked if he had someone in mind. His response was 'Yes, me.' Her reply was 'Forget
it.' "Id. at 462, 589 A.2d at 756. The attorney claimed that at the trial, the judge conveyed his
lack of patience with her to the jury by his facial expressions and body language. Id. Finally,
she claimed that after the plaintiffs had rested, the judge asked her at a chambers conference,
"'Do you want to give me your phone number now?' She answered 'Over my dead body.'"
Id. at 463, 589 A.2d at 757. Counsel argued that the judge was "a piqued suitor" and,
therefore, his impartiality could be questioned. Id. The court relied on the report of the
MARYLAND TASK FORCE, supra note 6, and the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct in
reaching its result. Id. at 463-64, 589 A.2d at 757.
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judges to the same rules imposed on employers under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.20 5 Vigorous enforcement of the specific prohi-
bition in the commentary to the new ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
is essential if sexual harassment is to be eliminated from our legal
system.
205. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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